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I. INTRODUCTION
It is no accident that many of the most provocative disputes about
the allocation of jurisdiction among nations have arisen in antitrust
cases.' Because antitrust regulates the competitive process, and because
competition itself never remains neatly within the boundaries of individ-
ual countries, the inevitable result is that more than one nation can and
does assert the right to prescribe mandatory rules of conduct. This in
turn leads to a pressing need to develop rules for the resolution of those
jurisdictional conflicts, a need made even more urgent by the absence of a
choice of law solution to the problem in which the courts of state A
would simply apply the competition law of state B in appropriate cases.
The export cartel problem described by Professor Rahl arises in
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean, The University of Chicago Law School. I gratefully
acknowledge the research support for this Article provided by the Bernard G. Sang Faculty Fund.
1 See, e.g., United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Info. Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH)
70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y.
1951), opinion on relief 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); United States v. Standard Oil Co. (New
Jersey), 1960 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 69,849 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 1960
Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,851 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Grand Jury Investigation of Shipping Industry, 1960
Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,746 (D.D.C. 1960); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom, Ltd., 448 F.
Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ill. 1978)(one of many opinions in the uranium cartel cases). For an example of a
case where cooperation succeeded, see the litigation on both sides of the Atlantic concerning the
Quinine Cartel in United States v. N.V. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemische Industrie, 428
F. Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); ACF Chemiefarma N.V. v. EEC Comm'n, [1967-1970 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8083 (1970).
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that antitrust has a monopoly on extraterritorial
disputes. For discussion of the general problem of extraterritoriality, see INTERNATIONAL CHAM-
BER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 442, THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF NATIONAL LAWS
(D. Lange & G. Born eds. 1987)[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE]; Sympo-
sium on Extraterritoriality of Economic Legislation, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (1987).
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large measure because the rules for allocating jurisdiction remain unclear
and contentious.2 Strict territoriality rules, under which nations may
take actions only with respect to persons and conduct that are literally
within their physical borders, make little sense for complex economic
arrangements that are based in several countries and that have effects in
many more. On the other hand, expansive recognition of so-called effects
jurisdiction, under which a nation may regulate persons or conduct
abroad having a sufficient effect within the nation, is difficult to justify
without simultaneously undercutting the fundamental notion of sover-
eigns as territorially defined entities.
I suggest in this Article that part of the reason for the problem lies
in the following dilemma for economic regulation: should the state regu-
late those whom it can reach legitimately under a regime of international
jurisdiction that prefers territoriality as the foundation of authority, or
should the state regulate those whose actions have the most profound
effects within its territory, even when they are physically located within
the borders of another state? Obviously, the state does not always face
this choice. Just as obviously, it often does, and it does so most pointedly
in the export cartel area. The nature of this problem also illustrates how
difficult it is, with questions of international jurisdiction, to maintain a
sharp distinction between the presumably preliminary jurisdictional in-
quiry and the substantive aspects of the case. In the final analysis, the
only sure way out of this dilemma involves elements of multilateral
agreement on the basic principles of economic policy and a greater will-
ingness at the national level to apply the substantive laws of the country
with the greatest regulatory interest consistent with those principles.
Territorial distinctions between nation-states are not likely to fade in sig-
nificance to anywhere near the degree with which they have faded within
federations such as the United States, or even Canada, and thus the
problems of both jurisdictional conflicts and substantive conflicts de-
mand solutions that respect the existence of national sovereignty.
In exploring this issue, I begin in Part II with my own description of
the export cartel problem for antitrust. Part III explores in detail the
larger question of the principles that should govern allocations of juris-
diction in economic regulatory cases, in light of the dilemma I have
noted. I conclude by suggesting some alternative ways for resolving
these jurisdictional conflicts, each of which is designed to respect two
limiting conditions. First, the nation should have a selfish interest in reg-
ulating the conduct, and second, the nation should be able to implement
its choices without trampling significantly on the interests of other states.
2 See Professor Rahl's An International Antitrust Challenge which begins this Symposium.
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II. THE LAW OF EXPORT CARTELS
A. International Jurisdiction and the Regulation of Exports
A basic question relating to the current export cartel problem is,
why should export cartels pose a particularly thorny problem for interna-
tional antitrust enforcers in the United States?3 Since the time the Sher-
man Act was passed, it specifically has covered restraints of trade "in
foreign commerce." U.S. exporters engage in one branch of foreign com-
merce by sending goods and sometimes services to other countries. As a
matter of first principle, these U.S. exporters are subject to regulation by
the U.S. government with respect to their export activities, no less than
with their employment practices, environmental practices, and occupa-
tional safety practices.
The first answer to the question lies in the fact that Congress chose
not to exercise full powers over export activities almost from the start.
Congress excluded exports from Section 3 of the Clayton Act,4 which
covers exclusive dealing and tying arrangements, and from Section 2(a)
of the Robinson-Patman Act,5 which deals with price discrimination. In
addition, two statutes have been passed with the express goal of exempt-
ing certain export arrangements from the antitrust laws: the Webb-
Pomerene Act of 1918, and Title III of the Export Trading Company
Act of 1982.6 Both statutes did so in response to the concern that U.S.
firms were at a competitive disadvantage in export markets.7 In order to
3 Export cartels are obviously a problem for other countries and regions with competition laws
as well, such as Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the European Economic Commu-
nity. See Competition Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-23 as amended, discussed in Goldman, Bilateral
Aspects of Canadian Competition Policy, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 401 (1988); the Gesetz Gegen
Wettbeverbsbeschrinkungen, BGBL.I 1081 (July 27, 1957), discussed in Gerber, The Extraterrito-
rial Application of the German Antitrust Laws, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 756 (1983); Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EEC Treaty or
Treaty of Rome]. Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty are discussed, inter alia, in North American
and Common Market Antitrust and Trade Laws, 1987 FORDHAM CORP. L. INT. (B. Hawk ed.
1988). Unless otherwise noted, however, I shall use the U.S. laws concerning export cartels as the
paradigmatic example, and I shall assume that other countries are the ones that feel the effects of
these cartels. The more general conclusions of the article are not, however, dependent on the direc-
tion of trade, nor on the specifics of any given country's law about export cartels.
4 Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982).
5 Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982). See also, I B. HAWK, UNITED
STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 165 (2d
ed. 1986).
6 The Webb-Pomerene Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1982). The Export Trading Com-
pany Act of 1982 is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4021 (1982)[hereinafter ETCA].
7 See, e.g., Report of the 1979 National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Proce-
dures, 295 (1979)[hereinafter 1979 National Commission Report], and supporting documentation for
the Webb-Pomerene Act. For materials on the ETCA, see e.g., New Opportunities Under the Export
Trading Company Act of 1982, 1983 L. Bus. 33, 87.
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understand what these statutes reveal about jurisdictional conflicts, it is
helpful to take a closer look at them.
The Webb-Pomerene Act begins by defining the words "export
trade" to mean "... solely trade or commerce in goods, wares, or mer-
chandise exported, or in the course of being exported from the United
States or any Territory thereof to any foreign nation."8 The definition
goes on expressly to exclude production, manufacture, and sales of the
same items for consumption or resale within the United States. Section 2
of the Act contains the key antitrust exemption: the Sherman Act does
not make illegal ".... an association entered into for the sole purpose of
engaging in export trade and actually engaged solely in such export
trade, or an agreement made or act done in the course of export trade by
such association. '
The two provisos to this language, usually cited for the proposition
that the antitrust exemption is quite narrow, also reveal on the positive
side the type of commerce Congress thought it was regulating in the stat-
ute. The first proviso stipulates that the association or act must not be
(1) in restraint of trade within the United States, or (2) in restraint of the
export trade of any domestic competitor of the association. The second
proviso stipulates that the association must not do anything that (1) arti-
ficially or intentionally enhances or depresses prices within the United
States, or (2) otherwise substantially lessens competition or restrains
trade within the United States.
Most commentators have emphasized either the limited role that the
Webb-Pomerene Act has played in U.S. export trade, or the negative ef-
fects the Act may have on the domestic market. For example, the 1979
National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures
(the "Commission") noted that exports through Webb-Pomerene as-
sociations accounted for only 2.4% of total U.S. merchandise exports
between 1958 and 1962.10 By 1976, the latest year for which the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") then had complete data, the total had
shrunk to 1.5% of total U.S. exports.11 Relying on FTC studies, the
Commission found that the companies using Webb-Pomerene associa-
tions tended to be leaders in oligopolistic industries, producers of a ho-
mogenous product, and large in size.12
In this context, the conduct that has been held to be permissible for
8 15 U.S.C. § 61.
9 I'd. § 62.
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Webb-Pomerene associations does raise serious questions about the Act's
consequences in the domestic market. The leading decision on this point,
United States v. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., 3 held that
certain restrictions, which were imposed by a Webb-Pomerene associa-
tion whose membership accounted for four-fifths of the U.S. export trade
in the relevant industry, were permissible because they were inevitable
consequences of any such association. Those permissible restrictions in-
cluded: (1) the inclusion of nearly all members of the industry in the
association, (2) the assignment of stock in the association according to
quotas, (3) the agreement to use the association as the exclusive foreign
outlet, (4) the refusal to handle exports of American competitors, (5) the
determination of both production quotas and price levels for each mem-
ber supplying products to the unit, (6) the fixing of foreign resale prices,
(7) a reasonably limited agreement not to withdraw from the association
at will, and (8) the charging of higher prices to U.S. exporters than to
foreign distributors, insofar as the differentials are related to different ser-
vice requirements. 4
On the other hand, the Webb-Pomerene Act does not immunize
agreements between associations and their foreign competitors.15 Fur-
thermore, it does not it help members of an association who wish jointly
to establish manufacturing units abroad, even if the reason is to avoid
foreign government restrictions that make export difficult or impossi-
ble.' 6 Finally, there is an odd "government financing" exception to the
Webb-Pomerene Act stating that the Act does not apply if the United
States is purchasing or substantially funding an export sale. 17
These exceptions are of more than passing interest for present pur-
poses because they help shed light on the extent to which Congress im-
plicitly asserts prescriptive jurisdiction over export commerce. The
question can be put as follows: does the Webb-Pomerene Act simply
identify conduct that the United States ought not to be regulating under
any circumstances, given principles of international jurisdictional compe-
tence, or does it identify conduct that the United States could regulate,
but is choosing not to, for reasons of domestic policy?
The answer to this question is quite clearly the second of these alter-
13 United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
14 Id. at 965-66.
15 United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
16 Minnesota Mining, 92 F. Supp. at 947.
17 See United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199 (1968); Department
of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, § 4.1 [hereinafter 1988
International Guidelines]; Case 5, reprinted in 55 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1391,
Special Supplement (Nov. 17, 1988).
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natives, for several reasons. First, from the point of view of international
law, there is nothing objectionable about a country regulating the con-
duct of persons within its borders, even if some or all of the effects of that
conduct will be felt overseas. Indeed, an argument for the contrary posi-
tion would go beyond anything that even the most ardent proponents of
objective territoriality have urged. It would mean that the sovereign in
whose territory agreements were concluded or conduct took place was
divested of jurisdiction in the international sense if the effects were felt in
other countries. Certainly the leading international decision on this
topic, the Permanent Court of International Justice's ruling in The S.S.
Lotus, holds no such thing. 8 In that case, the Court decided that states
were not obliged affirmatively to justify their exercises of jurisdiction
under international law, and that there was no principle of international
law that prohibited Turkey from prosecuting a French naval officer for
committing an offense that had effects in Turkish territory.19 No ques-
tion about the jurisdiction of French courts arose; to the contrary, the
French government argued in the alternative that the correct place for
the suit was in France.
The proposition that the territorial state has jurisdiction to prescribe
and enforce rules of law concerning acts and conduct within its territory
is one of the strongest tenets of international law.2" Along with that
power, nations have an obligation to respect the rights of other states and
their citizens. Thus, most nations would say that (1) they cannot expro-
priate the territory of aliens without providing an acceptable form of
compensation, (2) they must respect the diplomatic agents of other
states, and (3) some form of sovereign immunity must remain.2' There is
no need to belabor the point. If the United States wished to regulate the
behavior of export cartels based in the United States, international law
clearly would permit it to do so.
18 The S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10.
19 Id. at pt. III, para. 6. With respect to the first proposition, the Court said the following:
It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction
in its own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken place abroad,
and in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international law.
The Court rejected an alternative argument that the French had made, which was that exclusive
jurisdiction should rest in the state whose flag is flown over the ship on which the challenged con-
duct (not effects) took place.
20 See, e.g., Island of Palmas Case, 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829 (1928); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(1)(a) (1987)[hereinafter RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD)]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 17(a) (1965).
21 None of the examples I give is free from controversy. The fact that these and other practices
break down from time to time does not mean, however, that states do not ordinarily observe them
and acknowledge them to be part of customary international law.
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The question with respect to the Webb-Pomerene Act is therefore
the same as the question with respect to any other piece of legislation
Congress has passed that arguably regulates foreign commerce: did Con-
gress intend to reach the export-related activities of U.S. exporters in the
Sherman Act, which in turn would imply that the Webb-Pomerene Act
was necessary to relieve exporters of this burden?a a This is a classic
problem of statutory interpretation, not a jurisdictional problem.
Whatever may be the difficulties with asserting jurisdiction over foreign-
based conduct, export cartels do not present those issues.
From this standpoint, the Export Trading Company Act of 1982
(the "ETCA") is identical to the Webb-Pomerene Act. Once again, U.S.
exporters complained to Congress that the antitrust laws had a chilling
effect on the export trade of the United States; once again, Congress held
hearings and deliberated, deciding that the fears were justified enough
that a special antitrust exemption would be put in place. Although the
mechanism of the ETCA is different in that (1) it requires prior applica-
tion for a certificate of review, (2) certificates are granted upon a showing
that special statutory antitrust standards are satisfied, and (3) various
procedural consequences follow, the underlying premise is the same.23
The fact that it is arguably necessary to exempt or lessen the force of the
U.S. antitrust laws with respect to export trade means that Congress
could, and perhaps did, assert its authority over that conduct in the gen-
eral statutes.
B. Statutory Regulation of Export Arrangements
Given that many export arrangements do not fall within the Webb-
Pomerene Act, and that many exporters have not bothered to obtain an
Export Trade Certificate of Review, some export conduct remains poten-
tially subject to the Sherman Act and the Federal Trade Commission
Act.24 The question that has perplexed U.S. commentators has been
22 Cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), in which the
court said, ".... we are concerned only with whether Congress chose to attach liability to the con-
duct outside the United States of persons not in allegiance to it."
23 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4021; Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration,
Guidelines for the Issuance of Export Trade Certificates ofReview, 50 Fed. Reg. 1786 (2d ed. Jan. 11,
1985); DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, THE EXPORT
TRADING COMPANY GuIDEBOOK (1984).
24 The applicability of the Clayton Act to export conduct is more problematic, since most of its
sections expressly call for an effect "in a section of the country." In any event, there is little that the
Clayton Act would prohibit that cannot also be regulated by the Sherman Act. The discussion in the
text will therefore use the Sherman Act as the principal U.S. antitrust law that is implicated.
The Federal Trade Commission Act is a different matter. Under § 5 of that Act, the FTC may
reach everything that is prohibited by the other antitrust laws, as well as conduct that is contrary to
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when and why one should construe the statutes to reach the export-ori-
ented conduct, not whether there is power to do so. The difficulty of
answering this question is a function of the complexity of purpose that
one ascribes to the antitrust laws themselves. Viewed as the near-legen-
dary "Chicago School" has seen them, and in the words of the 1988 An-
titrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations
promulgated by the Department of Justice ("1988 International Guide-
lines"), the antitrust laws are designed to "ensuref the most efficient al-
location of our resources and the maximization of consumer welfare."'25
Others have stated the goal of the laws more broadly. Professor
Rahl, for example, has argued that the laws are more generally designed
to protect competition in the marketplace, regardless of who benefits
from that competition. 26 Still others have challenged the allocative effi-
ciency approach more directly, arguing that the antitrust laws serve
political and social functions that help to shape the meaning of the "com-
petition" that must be preserved.27
The appropriateness of U.S. antitrust coverage of export conduct is
problematic only for those who consider the laws to be strictly concerned
with the welfare of U.S. consumers. The need to regulate collusive or
monopolistic behavior of exporters operating within the U.S. market is
plain to one who is concerned with the integrity of the market itself,
along lines similar to the SEC's efforts to protect the reputation and func-
tioning of the securities markets. Political power is equally independent
of the destination of the goods or services in question. It is quite difficult,
however, to detect an effect on allocative efficiency within the United
States, or more specifically a reduction in U.S. consumer welfare, when
restraints of trade appear exclusively in export commerce.
If a consumer welfare oriented antitrust philosophy were of histori-
cal or aesthetic interest only, its problems with regulating export conduct
would be unimportant here. The truth, however, is at the other extreme.
Both from the standpoint of government enforcement policy over the last
the spirit of those laws or otherwise is an unfair competitive practice. See, e.g., Atlantic Refining Co.
v. FIC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 F.2d 3316 (1966); FTC v. Sperry &
Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
25 1988 International Guidelines, supra note 17, § 1. See also R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARA-
DOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978); Posner, The Chicago School ofAntitrust Analysis, 127
U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979).
26 See, eg., RahI, Applicability of U.S. Antitrust Laws to Export Commerce, 1986 FORDHAM
CORP. L. INST. 131-135; Rahl, International Application of American Antitrust Laws: Issues and
Proposals, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 336 (1980).
27 See, ag., Fox, Consumer Beware Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1714 (1987); Hovenkamp, Dis-
tributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1982); Pitofsky, The Political
Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051 (1979).
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eight years, and from the standpoint of developments in antitrust
caselaw, consumer welfare has gained a center-stage position, which, in
the eyes of some observers, crowds all pretenders entirely out of the thea-
ter. It is therefore worth exploring when export activities will escape
regulation under this theory, and when the economic effects in the
United States continue to be of a quality and quantity to justify antitrust
attention. I look first at instances where regulation is warranted under
this interpretation of the laws, and then at examples where it is harder or
impossible to defend.
The three principal examples of export-related conduct for which
consumer welfare antitrust theory recognizes a legitimate U.S. interest
and hence construes to be within the statutes are (1) anticompetitive ac-
tivity with respect to exports that "spills over" into activities for the U.S.
market, (2) anticompetitive activity with respect to exports that are actu-
ally intended to be reimported into the United States, and (3) anticompe-
titive arrangements designed to create an artificial short supply within
the United States by exporting excess production.28
The spillover cases are nearly indifferent to the foreign consequences
of the restraints in export trade. This theory, resting no doubt on human
nature, holds that if exporters A, B, and C all manufacture two different
products-item X which is exported, and item Y which is sold only in
the United States-and if they fix prices and quantities for the export of
product X, then they might be tempted to do the same thing for the
domestic sales of product Y. This is a real danger in an industry with
few producers and homogeneous products, which otherwise would be
prone to collusion, and it is quite appropriate to treat it like other infor-
mation exchange cases. 29 Note, however, that the foreign element is al-
most incidental.
The case of re-imports also requires little attention. An export fol-
28 I do not include in this list a fourth category that some might note-exports significantly
financed by the U.S. government. See, e.g., United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n,
393 U.S. 199 (1968); 1988 International Guidelines, supra note 17, § 4.1, Case5 (joint bidding). It is
missing from my list because it fits uncomfortably with the rigid consumer welfare focus of the
Chicago approach to antitrust, except insofar as the government is a consumer. However, no com-
plex theory ofjurisdiction over exports is needed to protect the government in its consumer capacity.
If the U.S. government suffers antitrust injury to its own property, it is entitled to sue for single
damages. Clayton Act § 4A, 15 U.S.C. § 15a. Other conduct amounting to fraud in government
transactions may be addressed under other statutes. In fact, the only theory justifying the Concen-
trated Phosphate rule is that in this one instance, U.S. taxpayers are entitled to the benefits of a
functioning competitive marketplace. No one has explained satisfactorily why this entitlement is not
enjoyed more broadly.
29 For a general discussion of the information exchange cases, and the way in which the ex-
change of information can be a "facilitating practice" for industry cartelization, see P. AREEDA & L.
KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT AND CASES paras. 247-259 (4th ed. 1988).
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lowed by a re-import looks nearly the same as a product-that never left
the United States in the first place. Naturally, anticompetitive practices
with respect to these products are the rightful concern of U.S. antitrust
authorities. Restraints in that kind of export trade are equivalent to re-
straints in trade within the United States. The only difficult question in
this area, as in many others, is the correct characterization of the trans-
action. Many goods are in fact shipped offshore for further processing
and are then re-imported perfectly legitimately into the United States.
Complex customs rules dictate the attribution of a country of origin for
those goods, usually based on the amount of value added or transforma-
tion that occurs in the intermediary country.
Contrived short supply comes closest to revealing a practice that
might affect export commerce directly. The Department of Justice's
1988 International Guidelines mention this, along with conduct actually
designed to affect U.S. price levels, as an example of a restraint in export
conduct that might fall under the antitrust laws:
[Export conduct] could have [a direct, substantial, and reasonably foresee-
able effect on trade or commerce within the United States or on import
trade or commerce] if supply in the relevant U.S. and foreign export mar-
kets were fixed or highly inelastic and U.S. firms accounting for a substan-
tial share of the domestic market agreed on the level of their exports in
order to reduce supply and raise prices in the United States.30
In other words, if the short- to medium-term supply of widgets is rela-
tively fixed worldwide, and if the U.S. firms manufacturing widgets
agreed to export enough widgets to create a domestic shortage, and those
widgets or the widgets made by foreigners could not easily re-enter the
United States due to spoilage, transportation costs, trade barriers, or
other similar factors, then domestic allocative efficiency would be
harmed by the export agreement.31
The reference in the 1988 International Guidelines to a "direct, sub-
stantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on domestic or import trade
or commerce tracks the language of the 1982 Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act (the "1982 Act"), a statute designed to clarify how
30 1988 International Guidelines, supra note 17, § 4.1.
31 In these circumstances, it is possible that the foreigners would be complaining about the
dumping of U.S.-made widgets in their markets. This would be true if the contrived shortage in the
United States were matched by an artificial oversupply in the foreign markets. One would then see
high U.S. prices and low foreign prices-the paradigmatic case of international dumping, within the
meaning of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. Many
countries and regions, including the economically powerful European Economic Community, have
well-enforced laws that are designed to counteract this practice. See generally J. BARTON & B.
FISHER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT ch. 5 (1986).
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far the U.S. antitrust laws reach internationally.3 2 The statute also ex-
pressly makes the Sherman Act applicable to conduct that has a direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect "on export trade or export
commerce" of a person in the United States engaged in export trade.33
One might conclude that restraints whose effects fall solely on foreign
consumers were obviously outside the statute, and that conclusion would
find a great deal of support in the cases that have applied the 1982 Act.3 4
That conclusion, however, begs part of the question, which is whether
the effects of an export cartel can be so neatly confined to foreign
markets.
In some cases, like Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India,35 the an-
ticompetitive actions involving exports also affect U.S. consumers. In
Pfizer, an alleged conspiracy to restrain trade in the manufacture, distri-
bution, and sale of broad spectrum antibiotics had been formed by six
pharmaceutical manufacturing companies. The cartel exported antibiot-
ics to foreign buyers, including India, and it sold them in the United
States. Although the opinion of the Court is not crystal clear, it certainly
holds that foreigners may be plaintiffs in U.S. antitrust actions, and that
a case involving harm to both foreigners and U.S. consumers may be
brought by those plaintiffs, seeking damages for their own injuries. The
legislative history of the 1982 Act indicates that Congress was not chang-
ing this result.3 6
Finally, in some cases, it is nearly impossible to find any effect on
U.S. consumer welfare. A case in which a group of U.S. exporters re-
fused to allow a competitor to join them in a joint venture designed to
penetrate foreign markets may be one in point. The excluded exporter
may be injured, particularly if the foreign market requires special con-
nections, linguistic abilities, or licenses before it can be penetrated, but
the firm's injury is not the same thing as injury to competition in general
in the U.S. economy. Advocates of allocative efficiency would tell the
firm to go sell elsewhere, unless its assets were so specialized to a particu-
lar foreign market that this option was unrealistic. Such cases are possi-
ble, but rare. Only a broader theory of antitrust would allow this
32 The 1982 Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982).
33 Id. § (1)(B).
34 See, e.g., The 'In' Porters, S.A. v. Hanes Printables, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 494, 1988-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 68,047 (D.N.C. 1987); Papst Motoren GmbH & Co. v. Kanematsu-Gosho (U.S.A.) Inc.,
1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,924 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Liamuga Tours v. Travel Impressions, Ltd.,
617 F. Supp. 920 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Eurim-Pharm GmbH v. Pfizer Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1102 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
35 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
36 See, e.g., 128 CONG. REC. H 1345 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1982)(remarks of Rep. McClory).
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excluded exporter to bring an action, in spite of the language of the 1982
Act that appears to contemplate these suits.
Under the allocative efficiency structure, a cartel or exporting mo-
nopolist that had absolutely no effects in U.S. markets or on competing
U.S. exporters would escape regulation under the U.S. antitrust laws. If
the cartel controlled a product for which there was little U.S. demand,
for which most of the world's supply was located in the United States,
and for which international arbitrage operations could not succeed, it
would pose the most difficult question for international regulation:
should the country where the cartel is operating undertake the task of
supervision under its domestic laws, or should the country or countries
where the economic effects are felt assume this responsibility? The sub-
stantive reach of the U.S. antitrust laws seems to preclude the first of
those options, even though international jurisdiction based on the territo-
riality principle would exist. On the other hand, if the country where the
effects were felt attempted to regulate, it could find itself embroiled in yet
another dispute over the extent to which it could interfere with the eco-
nomic policies of the territorial sovereign. With this apparent dilemma
in mind, one must turn to the broader problems of allocating jurisdiction
among states and resolving conflicts of law.
III. CONFLICTS OF JURISDICTION AND LAWS
So many others have written at length about the problem ofjurisdic-
tional conflicts, not to mention other conflicts of law, that it may require
excessive optimism to think that one can add to the debate in only a few
pages. At this point, the debate over the limits of a country's territorially
based prescriptive jurisdiction has focused on two primary options: the
jurisdictional rule of reason, more or less as described by the American
Law Institute in the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States (the "Restatement"), versus the objective effects rule.37 Af-
ter briefly describing those opposing positions, I will discuss some
problems, both theoretical and practical, with this characterization of the
37 Equally interesting debates have begun over the scope of nationality-based jurisdiction. For
example, in the export controls area, the United States often asserts jurisdiction over "U.S. origin"
goods, even if title has passed to a foreigner and the goods have come to rest in another country.
Although a vague claim of effects on U.S. national security or foreign policy conceivably could be
stretched into a territorial effects mold, the more likely jurisdictional basis in these cases is the
nationality of the goods themselves. For a general discussion of this problem, see Abbott, Collective
Goods, Mobile Resources, and Extraterritorial Controls, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 117 (1987).
Although bases for jurisdiction other than those in the territorial family certainly exist, the
discussion in the text will concern itself only with variants of territorial jurisdiction. This choice is
justified because other bases for jurisdiction play a minimal role in antitrust matters.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 10:56(1989)
problem. I then will suggest several possible solutions, drawing both on
international law and on the U.S. experience. It is clear enough that
there is no way definitively to organize the chaos.38 Nonetheless, like
others before me, I am hopeful that clarification of the source of the
problems may help to lead to partial or second-best solutions that are
more within human grasp.
A. The Debate Over Reasonableness
The modern world, it appears, cannot live without some recognition
that nations may prescribe binding rules of conduct for those whose ac-
tions have effects within the territory of the regulating nation, even if the
actors are permanently, partially, or temporarily outside the physical
boundaries of the prescribing nation. As noted above, almost no one
would argue for a perfectly Balkanized set of territorially limited rules,
under which a firm could conduct transborder arrangements with impu-
nity, no matter how deliberately or substantially it affected the target
country, as long as the host country was not offended or actually ap-
plauded the firm's actions. Effects jurisdiction, however, inevitably gives
rise to competing claims of prescriptive competence, namely that of the
nation where the effects are felt, and that of the nation where the actors
are based.
As I have written elsewhere, it is my view that no conflict over pre-
scriptive jurisdiction exists if both nations recognize and accept the legiti-
macy of the other's interest in the creation of rules in the particular
case.39 This is not to say that there is no conflict. Obviously there can be
the problem of which law will take precedence if the two are inconsistent.
It is only an effort to distinguish cases in which both nations recognize
the other's interest from those in which even this preliminary point is
disputed. Many international antitrust disputes that arise are of the sec-
ond type. In these disputes, the country where the actors are located
rejects the fundamental right of the country where the effects are felt to
create enforceable rules, as the Swiss Watchmakers case exemplifies.'
Other disputes, such as the litigation over the demise of Freddie Laker's
Skytrain transatlantic air service, are of the first type, because both coun-
38 Efforts to clear away the chaos are, however, always valuable. See Ongman, "Be No Longer a
Chaos". Constructing a Normative Theory of the Sherman Act's Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 71 Nw.
U.L. REV. 733 (1977).
39 Wood, Conflicts of Jurisdiction in Antitrust Law: A Comment on Ordover and Atwood, 50 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 179-80 (1987).
40 See United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Info. Center, 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,600
(S.D.N.Y. 1962). See also the discussion of this dispute in COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN
ANTITRUST ch. 6 (J. Rahl ed. 1970).
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tries recognize the validity of the U.S. interest.4"
The way in which the conflict ought to be managed or resolved will
be affected by whether the conflict is a conflict of laws, which is the first
type identified above, or a conflict of jurisdiction, which is the second
type above. Furthermore, a case in which the state's fundamental power
to prescribe the rule for any circumstances is at issue is different from one
in which the general legitimacy of the rule is acknowledged, but its appli-
cation to a particular person is challenged. In the United States, cases of
the latter type are typically addressed through the adjudicatory jurisdic-
tion doctrines: may state X apply its contract law to a person who has a
defined set of contacts with state X? The question, however, is somewhat
broader than the usual adjudicatory or personal jurisdiction inquiry. Us-
ing antitrust as the example, one can acknowledge that the United States
may prescribe rules for conduct that will have an anticompetitive effect
within its territory, but one might also conclude that the application of
that rule to a particular person's activity abroad would be excessive.
Here, the question whether the presumably valid rule may be applied in
judicial proceedings to this individual and the question whether the rule
itself may extend to this set of circumstances become nearly identical.42
The Restatement does not draw any of the lines that have been sug-
gested here very precisely, if at all. Its rule on jurisdiction to prescribe
law is initially stated very simply in section 402:
Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect
to:
(1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within
its territory:
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its
territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have
substantial effect within its territory; ....
Without the qualifying reference to § 403, this rule would be relatively
straightforward. Section 402(1) draws the line between permissible exer-
cise of prescriptive power and excessive exercise of that power on the
41 See Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., 3 All E.R. 39 (H.L. 1984).
42 One important respect in which the questions may not be identical has to do with the possibil-
ity of waiver. If the state lacked prescriptive competence, the individual would not be able to waive
her own state's objection to the exercise ofjurisdiction. If, however, the matter were conceived of as
"merely" an adjudicatory jurisdiction problem, U.S. doctrine allows an individual otherwise beyond
the reach of a court to consent to the court's personal jurisdiction, or (which is the same thing) to
waive the right to object. See, eg., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 20, § 421(3); Insurance
Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
43 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 20, § 402(1).
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basis of the substantiality of the conduct or effects within the territory of
the regulating state. As noted above, this bears a strong resemblance to
the minimum contacts tests designed to test adjudicatory jurisdiction, but
perhaps calls for a stronger or more objective connection to the territory
of the state than would be necessary for personal jurisdiction.
The trouble, or at least the controversy, arises over § 403. Section
403 limits the state's fundamental power to prescribe rules, declaring
broadly that states may not create rules where to do so would be unrea-
sonable, and setting forth eight illustrative factors to be taken into ac-
count."4 Under this approach, states must somehow refrain from
creating rules of law which would unreasonably infringe on the interests
of other states, in order to comply with international law. There is noth-
ing wrong with maintaining this limitation as a goal, but the case of anti-
trust demonstrates how difficult it is to enforce limitations of this type as
rules of international law. The Restatement's own § 415, which describes
jurisdiction to regulate anticompetitive activity in more detail, demon-
strates that the reasonableness approach requires detailed analysis of the
facts of each case before the legitimacy of the rule can be established.
Under this system, a national court that errs by upholding the applicabil-
ity of its antitrust rule to conduct outside its borders would place its
country in violation of international law.
There is a real risk in making violations of international law too easy
to create. The entire notion of such a violation, treated with skepticism
by many already, may become trivialized. This may be a more serious
problem in the United States than in most other countries, given the
heavy responsibility for the articulation of antitrust rules that the United
States has given to its courts, and the ability of private plaintiffs to initi-
ate and pursue cases in the U.S. courts. Ordinarily, before a country
places itself in violation of international law, its executive and/or legisla-
tive authorities make a deliberate decision to do so, aware of the conse-
quences that might ensue. It is simply unrealistic for the courts in the
44 The eight factors are: (a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state; (b) the
connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state and
the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated; (c) the character of the activity to
be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states
regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally ac-
cepted; (d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic system; (f) the
extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international system; (g) the
extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and (h) the likelihood of
conflict with regulation by another state. Id. § 403(2). Subsection (3) adopts an interest analysis
approach toward resolution of jurisdictional conflicts where more than one state can show valid
interests, under which deference to the state with the greater interest is called for.
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United States to assume the same task, yet that is what the Restatement
asks of them.
The alternative to the Restatement's approach is not wild-eyed and
excessive assertions of antitrust jurisdiction by U.S. courts. Most of the
benefits of § 403 and § 415 can be enjoyed without the overly dramatic
consequences of error through a sensitive process of statutory construc-
tion. This process of statutory construction begins with an appreciation
of the international law of jurisdiction and its force within U.S. courts,
and then applies those principles to the antitrust laws.
At the international level, however, a number of propositions seem
to be well established or on their way to general acceptance. The first
such proposition supports the validity of some kind of effects jurisdiction
in economic matters .4  The United States urged this for years, and the
Court of Justice of the European Communities recently endorsed a ver-
sion of it.46 In addition, effects jurisdiction is part of the German law.47
This is not to say that some would not still prefer to return to a time of
strict territoriality.48 Nonetheless, most developed countries today en-
dorse effects jurisdiction in concept. The second proposition is that inter-
national law does indeed place some outer limits on a state's power to
prescribe rules of law for foreigners who are acting outside its territory.
Judge Hand's statement about remoteness in the famous Alcoa case is
typical of a broad international consensus:
Almost any limitation of the supply of goods in Europe, for example, or in
South America, may have repercussions in the United States if there is
trade between the two. Yet when one considers the international complica-
tions likely to arise from an effort in this country to treat such agreements
as unlawful, it is safe to assume that Congress certainly did not intend the
Act to cover them.49
The question is therefore not whether there is such a limit, but how to
45 Effects jurisdiction in other areas, such as the classic case of the person standing near the
border of one country who shoots a person standing across the border in another country, are less
problematic. Both countries probably have a rule against murder. The country where the victim
was standing therefore can reasonably assert that the crime took place there, even though the trigger
may have been pulled elsewhere. Indeed, by playing semantic games, the country where the effect of
the unlawful act was felt may also be called a place where one of the elements of the crime took
place.
46 See A. Ahlstrdm Osakeyti6 v. Commission, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,491 (Sept. 27,
1988)[hereinafter Wood Pulp Case].
47 See Gerber, supra note 3.
48 Note, for example, the critical tone of the Overview of Industry and Trade Experience, in
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 1, at 3. The continuing British opposition
to broad extraterritoriality is described in D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, NATIONAL LAWS AND
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE: THE PROBLEM OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY (1982).
49 148 F.2d at 443.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 10:56(1989)
define it. The Restatement, as we have seen, defines the limit on a case-
by-case basis, using reasonableness as the measuring rod. Others, who in
my view have the better of the argument, define it in more objective
terms, based on factors like actual contacts, substantiality of effects, and
intent.5 °
With these principles of international law established, a second con-
straint on the courts appears through the general rules of statutory con-
struction they must follow. One such rule provides that courts must not
interpret statutes to have extraterritorial effect unless Congress has
clearly indicated that this is to be the case.5 1 With respect to the anti-
trust statutes, the "foreign commerce" clause satisfies the express author-
ization criterion, but Congress has modified the extent of extraterritorial
coverage in the 1982 Act, as described above.
A second rule of construction provides that statutes passed by Con-
gress should not be interpreted to violate international law in the absence
of a direct expression to the contrary. 52 Far from any indication in the
antitrust laws that Congress intended to contravene international norms,
the passage of the 1982 Act indicates that Congress is trying affirmatively
to confine the laws to reach only matters properly within the prescriptive
power of the United States.
U.S. courts faced with a case presenting extraterritorial elements
should therefore attempt to construe the statute with the limitations that
Congress intended, just as Judge Hand said they should in Alcoa. If the
court adopts an excessive construction, it has misinterpreted the statute
and may be corrected by Congress or a higher court, but it has not vio-
lated international law itself. The factors that the court takes into ac-
count in construing the statute may resemble those of § 403, or they may
be simply the "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable" test of the
1982 Act, unmodified by further jurisdictional reasonableness.
B. Resolving the Effects Dilemma
The analysis of international law leaves us with an acknowledged
power in a state to regulate conduct occurring elsewhere that has an ef-
fect within the territory, and with an understanding of the way that the
limitations imposed by international law ought to be reflected within do-
50 1 prefer the more objective approach for two reasons: it asks the courts questions that they are
realistically capable of answering, and it avoids transforming every case into a complex problem of
international law.
51 See, e.g., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963); Lauritzen v.
Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 576-79 (1953).
52 See Murray v. The Charming Betsey, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804)(Marshall, C.J.); Trans World
Airlines v. Franklin Mint, 466 U.S. 261 (1984); Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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mestic law. It indicates that the answer to the export cartel problem
posed at the end of Part I of this Article is to allow the countries that feel
the greatest economic effects from the cartel to regulate it, even if the
host country has chosen not to do so or has "regulated" the cartel by
giving its approval. Taken to the general level, this suggests an allocation
of international jurisdiction that follows effects lines, rather than territo-
rial lines, as the preferred solution.
Both practical and legal difficulties exist in this tentative answer to
the problem. On a practical level, it is often difficult to compel foreigners
to participate in judicial proceedings in a country where the effects of
their actions are being felt. One of the most notorious examples of this
has been the persistent failure of the U.S. authorities to prosecute suc-
cessfully the De Beers group for its alleged restraints on diamond trade.53
From a more legal standpoint, prosecution of another country's export
cartel may cause conflicts of its own. An export cartel may be en-
couraged by the host country because the host desires foreigners to make
overpayments to domestic firms. This possibility casts doubt on the wis-
dom of the suggestion that countries should simply respect one another's
publicly announced export cartels, at least if competitive principles are to
be preserved.5
4
Full recognition of the effects jurisdiction principle therefore can
come only at the price of creating relatively more conflicts of substantive
law. Country A, the host of an export cartel, specifically approves the
cartel's activities and hopes to increase its national wealth; Country B,
where most of the cartel's consumers live, deplores the cartel's actions
because of the monopoly overcharges that its citizens are paying. If the
cartel is sued in the courts of Country B, its real defense is not a lack of
B's prescriptive jurisdiction. The defense instead should be either that
the B courts ought to apply A law, or that the B courts ought to recog-
nize a defense of foreign sovereign compulsion (which is functionally the
same as the choice of law option here).
Substantive conflicts will not be resolved any more readily than ju-
risdictional conflicts, however, in the absence of international agreement
on which state interests may validly be pursued. It is possible, of course,
to avoid a conflict by construing the interest of one of the states in such a
way that there is no real conflict. Thus, for export cartels, one could
accept Professor Rahl's suggestion that the interest of the United States
is in a competitively structured market, and thus that an export cartel
53 DeBeers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212 (1945).
54 See Atwood, Conflicts of Jurisdiction in the Antitrust Field: The Example of Export Cartels, 50
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153 (1987).
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that distorts the market should be prosecuted whether the victims are
U.S. consumers or foreign consumers. If the U.S. antitrust laws must be
construed as limited to the welfare of U.S. consumers, however, Rahl's
solution is inadequate. Another possibility, at least in theory, would be
to permit a judicial proceeding against the cartel in its home country
(e.g., the United States), and to require the court to apply the law of the
place where the plaintiff's injury was felt (e.g., France). Even if one
overcame the traditional reluctance to apply the "public law" of other
nations, however, direct conflicts would exist any time the host country
affirmatively approved of the cartel's activities. In those cases, the courts
would be likely to apply forum law, thereby again leaving the injured
consumers without redress.
If the export cartel problem cannot be solved either with rules for
the alloction of prescriptive jurisdiction or with a conflict of laws ap-
proach, what is left? The solution that until now has seemed out of reach
is the one.patterned on the U.S. approach to adjudicatory jurisdiction.
In this field, the use of territory as a surrogate for the legitimacy of a
state's exercise of power over the person has given way to the "minimum
contacts" test. One looks to contacts with a state's territory to ascertain
if the exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable; the process does not
go the other way around.
International law has not taken that step, and it seems quite unlikely
that it will do so. The blurring of state boundaries within the United
States, bound by a common constitution, is a far different matter than the
analogous step for nation-states. Sovereignty itself continues to be de-
fined in territorial terms." Nonetheless, it should be possible on a sub-
ject-by-subject basis to approximate the inter-state consensus within the
United States, through the conclusion of international agreements.
An international agreement on competition policy ideally would set
forth the basic principles to which all signatories adhere, and according
to which all national laws should be construed. One such principle
should condemn cartelization, defined as collective acquisition and/or
exercise of market power. Another such principle would condemn what
the United States calls monopolization, or what the Europeans call the
abuse of a dominant position within a relevant market. The list should
probably be short and broad, so that it could be adapted most readily to
the different particular regimes of each signatory. If such a treaty were
in force, then the choice of law solution outlined above would become the
most attractive one. The forum court could no longer choose an an-
55 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 20, § 201.
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ticompetitive domestic law in violation of the treaty. Practical con-
straints on personal jurisdiction would not protect export cartels from
accounting for their anticompetitive actions against foreign consumers.
Finally, consumers in a particular country would receive a level of pro-
tection chosen by their own government, not a level of protection depen-
dent upon the home of the export cartel.
No solution is likely to be perfect, at least as long as countries de-
mand the right to regulate their own economies, to derogate from compe-
tition policy when they wish to do so, and to protect their local
businesses. Trade imbalances also exacerbate the problem because there
is often a hope that export cartels will help a country to reap economic
rents from its foreign buyers, thereby improving its own trade terms and
current account balances. If the political will were present to conclude
an international agreement, however, jurisdictional disputes would di-
minish in importance.
IV. CONCLUSION
The problem of export cartels with which I began was that the coun-
try most easily able to enforce competition rules against the cartel is not
going to be the country where the anticompetitive injury is suffered. This
is so because of legislative choices in the home country and not because
of any international jurisdictional problem. If there were sufficient con-
sensus on competition policy to allow effective international judicial
assistance, such as collection of documents abroad, service of process
abroad, and enforcement of judgments in other countries, an intermedi-
ate solution would be to recognize effects jurisdiction and to allow those
countries injured by the conduct the primary right to sue. One could
also protect the interests of the injured state through a redefinition of the
subjects covered by the laws themselves. As consensus has grown over
the years on both the content of jurisdictional rules and that of substan-
tive competition law, however, it is not unrealistic to hope for an interna-
tional agreement a.ong the lines described here some time in the
foreseeable future.
